At a glance
Superior performance of SIFT across four model steering tasks.
SIFT is compared against the control-based baselines BLUR[1] and POME[2], as well as the control-free optimizers AdamW and Muon. Below, we report each task's headline metric alongside the strongest baseline for that metric.
Machine unlearning
5.4%
ES‑Bio — residual hazardous knowledge ↓
Best baseline 9.3% (BLUR)
−3.9 ptsSafety alignment
42.8%
Strong Reject — refusal of unsafe prompts ↑
Best baseline 36.7% (POME)
+6.1 ptsSpeech adaptation
77.4%
Audio → Text accuracy on e‑SNLI ↑
Best baseline 73.6% (Muon)
+3.8 ptsHallucination mitigation
32.7%
Hallucination rate on RAGTruth ↓
Best baseline 38.5% (Muon)
−5.8 ptsFormulation and Motivation
Formulation and Motivation: A Constraint-to-Control Perspective.
Unlearning, alignment, cross-modal adaptation and hallucination control all share one shape: optimize a primary objective \(f\) without violating a constraint objective \(g\). Most methods dissolve the constraint into a regularizer — and inherit its conflicts.
The hard form is a simple bi-level problem: the constraint defines the solution set the primary objective is optimized over. The soft form is what almost everyone actually trains — convenient, but it hides the conflict rather than resolving it.
The four applications in this paper are the same problem with different contents plugged into \(f\) and \(g\):
| Application | Primary objective \(f\) | Constraint objective \(g\) |
|---|---|---|
| Machine unlearning | MSE representation-alignment loss on the retain set | RMU representation-misdirection loss on the forget set |
| Safety alignment | Cross-entropy SFT loss on a utility dataset | DPO loss on a safety preference dataset |
| Text-to-speech adaptation | Cross-entropy loss on text generation | Cross-entropy loss on speech generation |
| Hallucination mitigation | Prediction loss on non-hallucinated tokens | Negative cross-entropy loss on hallucinated tokens |
The conflict is measurable
Take the cosine similarity between the two gradients. When it goes negative, improving one objective can hurt the other[1].
\(\tau < 0\) means the two objectives disagree about which way to move. Measured per parameter block, per step.
The conflict is structured
Our finding: Conflict is structured and localizable. Rather than being uniformly distributed, conflict is sparse and concentrated in specific model components at particular stages of optimization. This locality is consistently observed across different tasks. We present several empirical observations below.
Every task has its own conflict signature
In unlearning (top left), conflict concentrates in the higher layers and recurs in bursts across training. In safety alignment (top right) it moves to the middle layers and to early steps. For both speech adaptation and hallucination mitigation (bottom row) the picture changes character entirely: conflict is confined almost exclusively to the query, key and value projections of self-attention, leaving the feed-forward blocks largely clean.
Method
Our Method: Subspace Control.
The route runs through model merging. Merging two task vectors produces a basis that is not orthogonal — and that non-orthogonality is precisely the interference. Fixing it has a closed form, and that closed form is already sitting inside a modern optimizer.
Step 1 — Where interference comes from
Write the two fine-tuned models as task vectors \(\Delta_f\) and \(\Delta_g\). A merged model that satisfies both objectives is their sum, which in spectral terms stacks the two bases:
The problem: \(\mathbf{U}_f\) and \(\mathbf{U}_g\) are generally not orthogonal to each other, so \(\hat{\mathbf{U}}^{\top}\hat{\mathbf{U}} \neq \mathbf{I}\). That off-diagonal mass is singular task interference. Whitening it is a Procrustes problem with a closed-form solution built from the SVD of \(\hat{\mathbf{U}}\).
From model merging to Muon
That Procrustes whitening is the matrix sign function — the very step Muon already performs on its momentum. Interference mitigation, it turns out, comes “for free” inside a spectral optimizer.
Read the descent direction \(\mathbf{M}\) as a generalized task vector between consecutive updates, and orthogonalizing it plays exactly the role that subspace control plays in merging. In practice \(\operatorname{msign}\) is computed with Newton–Schulz iterations, not an explicit SVD.
Step 2 — SIFT, in four moves
SIFT differs from plain Muon in two ways: it superposes the two objectives’ subspaces before orthogonalizing, and it applies msign to that expanded basis rather than to the raw momentum matrix.
Take both momenta
Collect \(\mathbf{M}_{f,t}\) and \(\mathbf{M}_{g,t}\), the momentum matrices of the primary and constraint objectives along the Muon trajectory at step \(t\).
Merge the top-\(K\) subspaces
Extract the leading \(K\) spectral components of each and stack them: \(\hat{\mathbf{U}}_t = [\mathbf{U}_{f,t}, \mathbf{U}_{g,t}]\), \(\hat{\mathbf{V}}_t = [\mathbf{V}_{f,t}, \mathbf{V}_{g,t}]\). Because momentum is strongly low-rank, \(K\) can be far below the matrix dimension.
Orthogonalize the merged basis
Apply msign via Newton–Schulz to get interference-free bases \(\hat{\mathbf{U}}^{*}_t\) and \(\hat{\mathbf{V}}^{*}_t\). This is the controlled intervention — both task subspaces survive, only their overlap is removed.
Step along the clean direction
Update \(\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \eta_t \hat{\mathbf{U}}^{*}_t (\hat{\mathbf{V}}^{*}_t)^{\top}\). The outer product acts as a gradient-orthogonalization operator built from both objectives at once.
Step 3 — Only intervene where there is a conflict
The extra SVDs are not free, so SIFT does not pay for them everywhere. Per parameter block, per step, it checks the alignment score \(\tau\). Below a threshold \(\epsilon\) < 0, the block gets subspace control; otherwise it takes an ordinary Muon step. That single rule is what makes the method controllable rather than merely different.
Try the localization rule
Move the threshold \(\epsilon\). Marked cells are the blocks where SIFT would switch on; everything else takes a plain Muon step.
- Blocks controlled
- —
- Steps touched
- —
- Layers touched
- —
The conflict field above is a stylized sketch built to match the pattern reported in Figure 2, not measured data — it is here to make the localization rule tangible. The real sparsity numbers are below.
Control really is sparse
Across all four applications, SIFT fires on roughly 6–14% of training steps and under 13% of model components. The overhead of the extra SVDs is bounded by how rarely they are needed — and the localization pattern differs per task, which is itself a finding.
Experiments
Experiments.
SIFT is compared against two control-free optimizers — AdamW and Muon, both solving the regularized form (2) — and two methods with explicit control: BLUR (bi-level gradient projection) and POME (one-shot Muon-style projection). All runs use 8× NVIDIA A6000 48 GB.
| Application | Training data | Base model | Evaluation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Machine unlearning | Forget: WMDP · Retain: WikiText | zephyr-7b-beta | ES-Bio/Cyber and MCQ-Bio/Cyber (↓); MMLU, TruthfulQA, IFEval, GSM8K (↑) |
| Safety alignment | Safety: PKU-SafeRLHF · Utility: Alpaca | Llama-2-7b | Strong Reject, JBB-Behaviors, Wild Jailbreak (↑); MMLU, GSM8K, IFEval, MNLI, MRPC (↑) |
| Text-to-speech adaptation | e-SNLI, COSE, OpenBookQA (interleaved speech–text) | GLM-4-Voice | Accuracy (↑) under Audio→Text, Audio→Audio, Text→Text, Text→Audio |
| Hallucination mitigation | RAGTruth | Llama-2-7B-Chat | Hallucination rate (↓); MMLU, GSM8K, TruthfulQA, QNLI, MNLI (↑) |
Removing hazardous knowledge without breaking the model
RMU unlearning on WMDP. The gains are largest on the open-ended entailment score, which suggests SIFT removes the underlying knowledge rather than just changing which answer gets selected.
Primary \(f\)
Representation-alignment MSE on the retain set — keep general utility
Constraint \(g\)
RMU misdirection loss on the forget set — erase hazardous capability
| Method | Unlearning (%) ↓ | Utility (%) ↑ | Runtime (min) |
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ES-Bio | ES-Cyber | MCQ-Bio | MCQ-Cyber | MMLU | TruthfulQA | IFEval | GSM8K | ||
| Base model | 62.3±0.3 | 46.7±0.2 | 64.1±0.2 | 44.8±0.4 | 58.2±0.3 | 39.5±0.2 | 10.4±0.3 | 35.6±0.4 | — |
| AdamW | 14.6±0.3 | 26.3±0.2 | 31.7±0.4 | 29.4±0.3 | 57.1±0.3 | 40.8±0.4 | 9.2±0.2 | 33.9±0.3 | 8.8 |
| Muon | 14.2±0.2 | 30.5±0.3 | 31.3±0.2 | 28.6±0.2 | 56.4±0.1 | 37.9±0.2 | 8.7±0.4 | 34.1±0.3 | 11.8 |
| POME | 15.8±0.4 | 29.6±0.3 | 29.2±0.3 | 27.5±0.2 | 57.3±0.3 | 38.4±0.4 | 9.6±0.2 | 34.7±0.3 | 9.9 |
| BLUR | 9.3±0.2 | 24.8±0.2 | 28.6±0.3 | 27.3±0.3 | 57.1±0.3 | 39.2±0.1 | 9.1±0.2 | 33.5±0.3 | 9.4 |
| SIFT (ours) | 5.4±0.3 | 19.7±0.2 | 26.8±0.2 | 26.4±0.1 | 56.8±0.3 | 38.6±0.2 | 10.3±0.3 | 33.8±0.4 | 20.2 |
SIFT reaches 5.4% ES-Bio and 19.7% ES-Cyber against BLUR’s 9.3% and 24.8%, while staying level with BLUR on utility (GSM8K 33.8 vs 33.5, IFEval 10.3 vs 9.1). Against POME — a one-shot task-vector edit — the gap on ES-Bio is 5.4% vs 15.8%, which is the case for multi-step localized control over a single post-hoc fix. Runtime is the trade: about double standard Muon.
Safety without the alignment tax
Llama-2-7b (not the chat variant, so the starting safety is weak) aligned by preference optimization. This is the clearest case of the paper’s claim: SIFT is the only method that improves safety and utility together.
Primary \(f\)
SFT cross-entropy on Alpaca — keep instruction-following
Constraint \(g\)
DPO on PKU-SafeRLHF — prefer the safe response
| Method | Safety (%) ↑ | Utility (%) ↑ | Runtime (min) |
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SR | JBB | WJ | MMLU | GSM8K | IFEval | MNLI | MRPC | ||
| Base model | 19.5±0.8 | 14.0±1.2 | 47.6±1.2 | 41.3±0.3 | 14.7±0.8 | 34.2±0.4 | 42.8±0.3 | 69.5±0.2 | — |
| AdamW | 33.2±0.6 | 28.0±1.1 | 52.8±0.4 | 36.6±0.5 | 8.4±0.9 | 31.9±0.3 | 36.2±0.2 | 62.7±0.3 | 110.3 |
| Muon | 36.4±0.3 | 26.0±1.3 | 52.0±0.9 | 36.1±0.5 | 9.5±0.7 | 30.4±0.4 | 32.8±0.1 | 63.3±0.4 | 191.2 |
| POME | 36.7±0.6 | 26.0±1.1 | 51.6±1.2 | 38.7±0.3 | 9.2±0.5 | 31.6±0.5 | 32.5±0.2 | 62.1±0.5 | 115.4 |
| BLUR | 35.8±0.3 | 29.0±0.5 | 54.4±0.9 | 37.4±0.6 | 9.8±0.4 | 31.3±0.8 | 37.6±0.4 | 65.9±0.2 | 114.7 |
| SIFT (ours) | 42.8±0.6 | 31.0±0.4 | 56.0±1.0 | 39.2±0.6 | 11.6±0.5 | 32.7±0.5 | 40.5±0.4 | 68.4±0.6 | 215.6 |
SIFT wins every safety and every utility column. The mechanism explains why: BLUR deletes the part of the utility gradient that aligns with the safety objective, and that part carried useful utility information; SIFT keeps both task-relevant components and removes only their interference. Conflicts here sit in the middle layers and fire early — a different pattern from unlearning.
Adding speech without forgetting text
GLM-4-Voice fine-tuned on interleaved speech–text data. The steering challenge is cross-modal forgetting: improving one modality tends to cost the other.
Primary \(f\)
Cross-entropy on text generation
Constraint \(g\)
Cross-entropy on speech generation
| Method | Audio → Text | Audio → Audio | Text → Text | Text → Audio | Runtime (min) |
||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| e-SNLI | COSE | OpenBook | e-SNLI | COSE | OpenBook | e-SNLI | COSE | OpenBook | e-SNLI | COSE | OpenBook | ||
| Base model | 27.2 | 42.1 | 12.6 | 20.1 | 41.6 | 11.2 | 60.6 | 66.2 | 54.7 | 42.8 | 34.5 | 43.4 | — |
| AdamW | 70.3 | 46.7 | 48.6 | 68.6 | 48.1 | 27.5 | 78.9 | 74.1 | 68.2 | 74.1 | 52.9 | 54.2 | 44.6 |
| Muon | 73.6 | 48.5 | 53.4 | 71.5 | 49.1 | 27.3 | 79.9 | 72.8 | 64.4 | 74.3 | 52.4 | 53.8 | 47.9 |
| POME | 73.3 | 47.2 | 53.4 | 70.6 | 48.2 | 25.7 | 80.6 | 72.3 | 64.5 | 74.1 | 52.2 | 53.7 | 24.7 |
| BLUR | 69.6 | 43.2 | 47.1 | 68.6 | 44.1 | 20.4 | 80.1 | 72.2 | 63.1 | 77.4 | 53.6 | 51.5 | 46.1 |
| SIFT (ours) | 77.4 | 56.3 | 57.1 | 77.1 | 53.4 | 29.5 | 80.4 | 75.2 | 64.1 | 79.6 | 53.5 | 54.3 | 51.3 |
Standard deviations omitted here for width; they are in Table 5 of the paper. The audio-input settings are the hard ones — they need accurate semantic extraction from speech — and that is where SIFT gains most: on average +5.1 points on Audio→Text and +4.0 on Audio→Audio over the second-best method, Muon. BLUR underperforms across most settings, which suggests its projection removes gradient components that training a speech LLM actually needs.
Suppressing hallucinated words, keeping the rest
Llama-2-7B-Chat on RAGTruth, where a single response mixes hallucinated and grounded spans. The unlearning objective targets the hallucinated words; the standard training objective protects everything else.
Primary \(f\)
Prediction loss on non-hallucinated tokens
Constraint \(g\)
Negative cross-entropy on hallucinated tokens
| Method | Hallucination rate (%) ↓ |
Utility (%) ↑ | Runtime (min) |
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MMLU | GSM8K | TruthfulQA | QNLI | MNLI | |||
| Base model | 73.2±1.6 | 46.5±0.4 | 20.4±1.1 | 30.2±1.6 | 68.7±0.6 | 56.2±0.5 | — |
| AdamW | 39.1±1.9 | 46.1±0.4 | 17.4±1.1 | 28.9±1.6 | 68.3±0.6 | 56.2±0.5 | 8.1 |
| Muon | 38.5±1.7 | 46.2±0.4 | 17.8±1.1 | 29.0±1.5 | 68.2±0.6 | 56.2±0.5 | 12.0 |
| POME | 41.1±1.5 | 46.0±0.4 | 17.8±1.1 | 29.2±1.6 | 68.2±0.6 | 56.1±0.5 | 10.6 |
| BLUR | 44.3±2.2 | 46.0±0.4 | 15.4±1.0 | 27.1±1.6 | 68.0±0.6 | 56.2±0.5 | 8.6 |
| SIFT (ours) | 32.7±1.6 | 46.2±0.4 | 17.8±1.1 | 29.0±1.6 | 68.2±0.6 | 56.2±0.5 | 26.4 |
SIFT gives the lowest hallucination rate by a clear margin over the next-best method while holding utility level with the control-free optimizers. BLUR is the outlier in the other direction: it is the worst at reducing hallucination here and it drops utility as well (GSM8K 15.4, TruthfulQA 27.1), consistent with discarding gradient components that mattered.
| Input query | Summarize the following news within 161 words: … Five people were infected and three died in the past year in Kansas from listeria that might be linked to Blue Bell Creameries products, according to the CDC… |
|---|---|
| Original model | … This is the third time Blue Bell has taken action due to listeria contamination, and the company is cooperating with investigations. No illnesses have been reported directly linked to the contaminated ice cream, but five people in Kansas have died from listeriosis in the past year after consuming Blue Bell products. |
| Mitigated model | … This recall follows past listeria outbreaks in Kansas and Texas, where five people were infected and three died, some after consuming milkshakes made with Blue Bell ice cream. Blue Bell is cooperating with authorities, emphasizing safety, and other Blue Bell products are not affected. |
| Application | Subspace dimension \(K\) | Threshold \(\epsilon\) |
|---|---|---|
| Machine unlearning | 128 — well below the 4096 matrix dimension | −0.1 |
| Safety alignment | 192 — matched to the effective rank | −0.1 |
| Text-to-speech adaptation | full rank — no gain from truncation | −0.6 (e-SNLI) · −0.4 (COSE) · −0.5 (OpenBookQA) |
| Hallucination mitigation | full rank | −0.8 |
Limitations
Where it costs, and what is left open.
SIFT builds its subspaces with SVDs, so it is slower: roughly double standard Muon on unlearning (20.2 vs 11.8 min) and hallucination mitigation (26.4 vs 12.0 min). Localization keeps that bounded, but the paper names efficiency as the main direction for future work. Also, everything here is post-training; whether subspace control extends to constrained pre-training is untested.
References
Other Cited Works
- Reisizadeh, Hadi, et al. “BLUR: A bi-level optimization approach for LLM unlearning.” Proceedings of the 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers), 2026.
- Liu, Yong, et al. “POME: Post Optimization Model Edit via Muon-style Projection.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.06627, 2025. arXiv
Citation
Cite this work
@article{huang2026subspace,
title = {Subspace Control: Turning Constrained Model Steering into
Controllable Spectral Optimization},
author = {Huang, Yancheng and Wang, Changsheng and Fan, Chongyu and
Lang, Yicheng and Shang, Bingqi and Zhang, Yang and Hong, Mingyi
and Qu, Qing and Velasquez, Alvaro and Liu, Sijia},
journal = {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.04231},
year = {2026}
}
Acknowledgements
This work was carried out by the OPTML Group at Michigan State University together with collaborators at the MIT–IBM Watson AI Lab, the University of Minnesota, the University of Michigan and the University of Colorado Boulder.
SIFT builds directly on the Muon optimizer and is evaluated against BLUR and POME; the benchmarks used — WMDP, PKU-SafeRLHF, RAGTruth, e-SNLI, COSE, OpenBookQA and the GLUE tasks — are the work of their respective authors, cited in the paper.